[Cite as Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905). NOTE: This decision concerns the protection against double jeopardy during a period when the Philippine Islands were a U.S. territory. Three men were acquitted of murder and convicted of assault. On appeal the assault conviction was reversed and they were convicted of murder which they had been acquitted of. The Supreme Court decided this did not violate the protection of double jeopardy because the accused appealed and asked for review. The Majority opinion noted concerning the act applying the Bill of Rights to the Territory: "The whole language is substantially taken from the Bill of Rights set forth in the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, omitting the provisions in regard to the right of trial by jury and the right of the people to bear arms, and containing the prohibition of the 13th Amendment, and also prohibiting the passage of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws." (P. 528 this page) Since the right to arms and the right to trial by jury were both withheld from the Philippine Territory, it is unlikely the ommission indicates they were considered state's rights. This becomes more apparent when the Tenth Amendment, explicitly a state's right, was also withheld but the Court did not to enumerate it as an exception. The Court made a similar comment a year earlier in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 123-124 (1904).]
[Trono v. U.S. continued
Return to pages 521-527 (Majority opinion).
Currently at page 528 (Majority opinion cont.).
Proceed to pages 529-534 (Majority opinion cont.).
Proceed to pages 535-540 (Dissenting opinions).]
[paragraph continued from previous page] upon conviction for a lower grade, and reopen the case upon a new trial to the entire original charge. The Philippine law is tantamount to such a statute in a State; and Justices Grier and McLean have said or implied, in United States v. Harding and United States v. Keen, supra, that the Federal Constitution does not throw the protection against second jeopardy around a criminal who seeks a new trial.
Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiffs in error seek a reversal of the judgment in their case on the ground that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands had no power to reverse the judgment of the court of first instance, and then find them guilty of a higher crime than that of which they had been convicted in that court, and of which higher crime that court had acquitted them, and they contend that such conviction by the Supreme Court of the islands was a violation of the act of Congress, passed July 1, 1902, 32 Stat, 691, a portion of the fifth section of that act providing that "no person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment."
This language is to be found in connection with other language in the same act, providing for the rights of a person accused of crime in the Philippine Islands. The whole language is substantially taken from the Bill of Rights set forth in the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, omitting the provisions in regard to the right of trial by jury and the right of the people to bear arms, and containing the prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment, and also prohibiting the passage of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
The important question to be determined is, whether this action of the Supreme Court of the Islands did violate the act of Congress, by placing the accused twice in jeopardy.
The meaning of the phrase, as used in the above-mentioned act of Congress, was before this court in Kepner v. United States, decided in May, 1904, 195 U.S. 100, [paragraph continues next page]
[Return to pages 521-527 (Majority opinion).
Currently at page 528 (Majority opinion cont.).
Proceed to pages 529-534 (Majority opinion cont.).
Proceed to pages 535-540 (Dissenting opinions).]